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NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK. Albany: Williams Press, Inc., 1943. Pp. 370.
TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK. Albany: Williams Press, Inc., 1944. Pp. 375.
Since these are but two of an excellent series of reports, a review
ought not so much stress these particular volumes as call attention to
the general high standard of the entire series, a fact which appears to
have been insufficiently appreciated by lawyers and scholars. Both these
reports follow the model of earlier years. After the formal introduc-
tion, we have an account of the particular recommendations approved by
the Council during the year, followed by the usual departments, includ-
ing judicial statistics and the research studies on special projects. Each
year there are usually some thirty or more subjects under consideration
or recommended for adoption by the legislatures or the courts; and of
these, half appear destined for immediate, and nearly all for ultimate,
adoption. In the ten years of the Council's history, it has made some
235 recommendations, and has had the truly amazing success, perhaps
unique in judicial council history, of witnessing the adoption of all but
about 30. Of the recommendations not adopted, 15 are being resub-
mitted. With these eliminated, the record of success for the Council is,
therefore, almost 95 per cent.
From their nature the reports should be of vital interest to lawyers,
legislators and students. The research studies at the end are to be espe-
cially commended, for they are essays worthy of extensive citation on
the subjects treated, as, indeed, the reviewer has often found. Thus,
the first of these volumes contains complete monographs on the subjects
of judicial notice of matters of law and service of process by publica-
tion, with recommendations for change thus thoroughly buttressed by
substantial research; while the second takes up in detail subjects rang-
ing from court rule-making power through a complete corrective re-
vision of the judiciary law, a proposal for service of process on the
personal representative of a deceased nonresident motorist, and a recom-
mendation for a unification of requirements of notices of claims against
municipal corporations, to a detailed consideration of supreme court mo-
tion practice.
Even so seemingly unpromising a subject as judicial statistics has
much to tell us about court operations. The figures presented in these
reports are surprisingly complete, in view of the limited machinery in-
volved in their collection. They are obtained by reports from the court
clerks, rather than by the more intricate system of individual case reports
used by the Administrative Director of the United States Courts. The
federal system of statistical reporting is comparatively new; it will be
interesting as time goes on to compare the workings and product of
these two systems, almost the only ones in this country regularly giving
court data at all complete. Meanwhile these reports are to be recom-
mended for careful study. I wonder how many lawyers realize the
great proportion of cases settled or otherwise discontinued before trial
(over 40 per cent in the state supreme court) or without any trial, even
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a formal one (nearly 60 per cent of the total). Actual contested trials
represent a small part (about 15 per cent) of the total civil business.
The number of jury trials in the supreme court-averaging in the judi-
cial' year 1941-42 about 9 per cent in civil cases, as against some 6 per
cent of nonjury trials, and in the last judicial year, about 8 per cent,
as against 62 per cent of nonjury trials-is larger than in the federal
system or in states such as Connecticut, where the proportionate figures
of jury and nonjury cases would be at least reversed. The large func-
tion of our courts as collecting, arbitrating, and compromising agencies
is, I think, rarely thought about; but it is an important, perhaps in some
ways the most important, feature of the judicial establishment. Inci-
dentally one wonders whether the incidence of war and declining man
power has had some influence in bringing about the decline in jury trials
noted.
Many of the statistical details suggest interesting lines of inquiry.
Thus, the reviewer has always been intrigued by the supposedly great
prevalence of motions for bills of particulars in New York practice, as
well as by the Council's remedy for the overuse of this motion, which
was in effect an automatic granting of the motion except where the
opponent of the moving party was able to persuade the court of the
impropriety of the demand.1 I must confess this seemed to suggest
what is reputed to be the Keeley cure for drunkenness,.i.e., more drink-
ing. Now the figures demonstrate that love of this dilatory procedure is
overwhelmingly greater in Brooklyn.than anywhere else. Thus, in the
judicial year 194142, covered by the Ninth Report, the number of such
motions in the supreme court there was 6,410, out of a state total of
8,853, and was about double the number in Manhattan, with the rest of
the state almost unrepresented in the figures (e.g., only 22 appearing
for the large Buffalo district). This is clearly not a temporary phe-
nomenon, but a customary situation, as other reports have shown; in-
deed, the Tenth Report shows a slight increase for Brooklyn (nearly 64
per cent of the total, as against 61 per cent for the earlier year), while
the Buffalo number has gone down to four such motions. The Council
might be well advised to seek further the reason why this particular tree
(or weed) grows so vigorously in Brooklyn; I suspect it may be found
in some matter of calendar tactics, such as fruitful delay for the mov-
ing party, rather than in the sheer merit of the motion.2 And if this is
so, the Council may wish to re-examine its encouragement of this mo-
tion, particularly in the light of the opposed federal trend to discourage
it for the more effective discovery remedies.The diversity of views among practitioners of reform just noted
suggests that a union of procedural reformers might well be formed in
order that guild principles might be adopted, and even the semblance of
1. See the Council's SECOND ANNUAL REP. (1936) 137-159.
2. If investigation were extended to other courts, e.g., county, city, and munic-
ipal courts, it appears from the tables that particulars thrive decidely less upstate
than downstate. Do New York lawyers differ in kind, depending on their loca-
tion, or are they simply realists, shaping their course with an eye on the state
of business, and perhaps the judicial attitude, in a particular court, rather than
with any desire of advancing the science of pleading or any real hope of obtaining
substantial admissions from their opponents?
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division among experts thus avoided. As another example, it may be
observed that the Council here reiterates its rather determined support
of a requirement of an oath to all pleadings, stating that this will pre-
vent the institution of actions on baseless claims and the padding of
claims generally. This recommendation was made just after the federal
advisory rules committee had decided that verification was so far an
empty formality-useless in itself, as well as depreciating the value of
the oath for other purposes-that it should be superseded 'by the simple
certificate of counsel as to his belief in the good ground for the plead-
ing, as provided in Federal Rule 11.
These observations become perhaps still more pertinent in the light
of the Council's lengthy study in its latest volume of state motion prac-
tice, with suggestions for revision of the separate compartmentalized
motions authorized under the New York Rules of Civil Practice. The
suggestions all seem individually valuable, as in general tending to do
away with the old formal motion on the face of the pleadings, i.e., the
ancierit demurrer, and to authorize further the use of affidavits or other
means of directly ascertaining the merits of the dispute. But the neces-
sity of using a formally different motion in situations only slighly differ-
ing is still maintained; the thoroughgoing practice of a single motion is
not attempted. Under the Federal Civil Rules the number of motions
was sharply cut down and provision was made for a consolidated mo-
tion. Even that has proved inadequate; and in practice the federal
courts have pretty thoroughly established both the desirability and the
workability of what has been termed the "speaking motion," so much so,
indeed, that some of the committee are now recommending a formal in-
tegration of the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judg-
ment. Though the Council's recommendations thus recognize a desirable
trend, one wonders whether New York practice would not profit in
the long run by rejection of these partial reforms now in the hope of
more thorough reform later.
Thinking such thoughts and having in mind the outstanding record
of success that the Council has achieved, one is led to wonder whether
the time has not now arrived when the Council should lend its prestige
to more drastic reforms which are in line with the earlier traditions of
the Empire State. For in 1848, with its Field Code and the union of
law and equity, New York led the way for all English-speaking coun-
tries in procedural reform. Code tinkering and press of judicial busi-
ness so debased the practice, however, that by the dawn of the twentieth
century, New York procedure was a fearful, if not a wonderful, thing.
Again an opportunity for leadership arose with the report of the Board
of Statutory Consolidation in 1915, under the chairmanship of Justice'
Rodenbeck, recommending court rule-making power and the Roden-
beck rules-a fine system worthy of comparison with the most modern
codes or rules.3 But with the rejection of this outstanding report for
the dubious Civil Practice Act, which Governor Smith finally signed
3. REP. BOARD OF STAT. CONSOL., N. Y. (1915); Gross, New York's Proposed
Simplified Practice Act (1916) 25 YALE L. J. 369; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928)
25-27.
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on its approval, most reluctantly given, by the State Bar Association,4
the opportunity was lost. Later events suggest that a veto might have
been the more effective course in the long run; at any rate, pleading and
procedure in New York remained at a low ebb, indeed, until the Coun-
cil was established in 1934. The Council undertook the job of correct-
ing many obvious deficiencies of the Civil Practice Act, including the
elimination of the old and barren restrictions on joinder of causes of
action and of counterclaims. These specific tasks it has now completed;
and broader fields of accomplishment should now lie before it.
After all, many things have happened since the setback of 1919-20;
for one thing the successful reform of federal procedure has made
simplified pleading respectable, and has stimulated many of the states to
renewed ventures. With its prestige of achievement against the back-
ground of the modern trend towards procedural simplicity, the Council
is, it seems to this reviewer, now in "a position finally to make inapplica-
ble the reproach which the late Senator Walsh always visited on New
York procedure in justifying his opposition to a uniform federal proce-
dure as the foiling of a metropolitan scheme to substitute Eastern con-
fusion for Western simplicity. The time is ripe, it would seem, for the
proposal of something as fine and as forwardlooking at least as the
Rodenbeck plan of 1915. Of course, the necessary first step is the pas-
sage of an act giving the courts real rule-making power along the lines
of the federal system. It is an encouraging sign that in its latest re-
port herewith the Council returns to a subject which it had tentatively
approached in its Fifth Report, namely, the grant of real rule-making
power to the courts; and though it has not yet come to the point of
definite recommendation, its careful research into the situation in other
jurisdictions, together with its objective noting of the all too frequent
gap between promise and performance in this field, leads us confidently
to expect that it will soon step forward boldly in support of a complete
grant of authority to the courts and its full use thereafter by the courts.
Let us hope that this encouraging trend presages an all-out forward
movement in New York in the field of procedural reform under the
stimulus of Council leadership.
CHARLES E. CLARK*
PRISONERS OF WAR. By WILLIAM E. S. FLORY.1 Introduction by
NORMAN H. DAVIS. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public
Affairs, 1942. Pp. 179. $3.25.
Dr. Flory put a great deal of work into writing this book. He is
entitled to the satisfaction of knowing that it is one that every student
of international law should have in his library. The wealth of references
in the footnotes and the Selective Bibliography at the end of his treatise
4. See reports of the Association from 1916 to 1921, particularly 44 N.Y.S.
BAR Ass'N REP. 421-545 (1921); CLARK, loc. cit. supra note 3; Medina, Some
Phases of the New York Civil Practice Act and Rules (1921) 21 COLUMIBIA L.
REv. 113; Comment (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 904, 906.
* United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit.
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